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W
hen the Doha Round of trade negotiations was launched 
in 2001 in Doha, Qatar, it was proclaimed as the “Doha 
Development Agenda” (DDA). While it appeared as a prom-
ising political decision—in particular for middle-income 
countries (MICs) specialized in agriculture (Argentina, Brazil) 
or with strong interests in textiles and apparel (China, 
India)—the economic impacts of a potential Doha agreement 
remain uncertain, in particular for LDCs. LDCs not only have 
very special economic features as far as trade issues are 
concerned, but also exhibit diverse economic and trading 
capabilities. Although from the onset LDCs have been targeted 
as the main beneficiaries, it has never been clear how this round 
could address their economic and trade interests. 
To this extent, several key questions remain. LDCs have 
been the main beneficiaries of important preferential market 
access regimes such as the Everything But Arms (EBA) initia-
tive of the European Union; so, what would be the implications 
of potential preference erosion from multilateral liberalization? 
Might increased competition resulting from the multilateral 
tariff reduction in the textile and apparel sectors reduce LDC 
access opportunities in industrial markets and hence cause a 
deterioration of their terms of trade? Most of these countries 
are net importers of food products, the world prices of which 
are expected to rise due to trade reform. Are there alternatives 
that can mitigate such negative effects for LDCs, or even 
compensate them for their losses? 
The release of the detailed modalities in May 2008 makes 
it possible to carry out an in-depth analysis of the expected 
economic impacts of a possible Doha agreement by allowing us 
to define a central scenario. In addition to the central scenario 
based on current modalities, we propose five alternative 
scenarios that focus on DFQF access for LDCs. The analysis is 
done through the MIRAGE general equilibrium model of the 
world economy, with main specifications as described in Box 1.1
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The benefits least-developed countries (LDCs) can draw from a multilateral trade reform as designed by the modalities 
made public in May 2008 are negligible, and some countries will even face adverse effects. World Trade Organization 
(WTO) negotiators should make a supplementary effort in favor of the poorest countries. The Duty-Free Quota-Free 
(DFQF) Initiative moves in the right direction, but it should be extended not only from a product point of view—with a 
100, not 97, percent application—but also in terms of geographic coverage. This initiative has to be supported by both 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and BrIC (Brazil, India, and China) countries.  
It is in the interests of Asian LDCs to prioritize full openness of OECD markets (a 100-percent DFQF regime) and full 
access to the U.S. market in particular, while African countries will draw more benefits from a geographic extension of this 
regime to BrIC countries.
1 The MIRAGE (Modeling International Relationships in Applied General Equilibrium) model was developed at the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et 
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) in Paris. A full description of the model is available in Decreux and Valin (2007). Based on standard and robust 
assumptions, it should be noted that the model may underestimate the positive effects of trade reform, particularly when such reform drives new investments, 
technology improvements, or important trade or production diversification.LeAsT-DeveLoPeD CounTries ToDAy
Currently, LDCs face a lower average duty on their exports 
than MICs (4 versus 5.1 percent), but the situation differs 
across individual countries. Over half the WTO LDCs faced a 
higher average duty on their exports compared with the world 
average in 2008. On the other hand, seven LDCs faced a low 
average. This discrepancy in terms of protection faced by 
various LDCs can be explained either by the product composi-
tion of exports (some LDCs face low protection on their 
exports as they specialize in products like oil, diamonds, and 
gold that are minimally taxed worldwide) or by the preferences 
that they have been granted.
LDC exports are highly concentrated in terms of products, 
and this export concentration has dramatic effects on the 
pattern of protection faced by LDCs (Figure 1). Looking at the 
revenue from tariffs levied on WTO LDC exports in OECD 
countries—except Mexico and New Zealand—only 3 percent 
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of the products account for 96 percent of this revenue. This 
element has to be kept in mind when considering the proposals 
on the table today.
 Another potential source of deterioration of terms of trade 
arises from LDCs’ net trade balance in agriculture and 
agrofood products. These sectors may be subject to large 
augmentations in world prices due to the removal of distortions 
that today impede world demand and enhance world supply. 
The net agricultural trade balance of WTO LDCs reveals that 
among 28 countries for which statistics are available, 18 are net 
food-importing countries.2 In terms of products, LDCs’ trade 
deficit is particularly high for sectors—like milk and other 
dairy products, rice, wheat, and meat and meat products—that 
are currently subject to large distortions and are expected to 
undergo large variations in world prices.
Box 1—Methodology
Tariff reform is implemented at the disaggregation level of the MAcMap-HS6v2.1 database with 
tariff data for 2004 (including 5,113 products, 170 importing countries, and 208 exporting 
countries). The analysis accounts for all major changes that occurred up to 2008, including major 
regional trade agreements (RTA), new WTO members, and so on. The tariff scenarios are then 
implemented in the MIRAGE model.
Macroeconomic data (such as world trade flows, production, consumption, intermediate use of 
commodities and services) come from the GTAP 7 pre-release 6 database. The modeling exercise 
assumes perfect competition. The excluded products list in the DFQF initiative is defined according 
to the methodology defined by Jean, Laborde, and Martin (2008).
The study focuses on LDCs and includes 14 LDC regions, 7 high-income countries (HICs), and 
14 MICs. The sector decomposition is highly detailed in terms of agriculture (with 11 sectors), since 
most of the protection faced is in this sector. All other sectors are nonagricultural, including  
12 industrial sectors where LDCs are highly specialized and 2 services sectors. 
A baseline is implemented from 2008 to 2025, which depicts the world without multilateral 
reform and without new RTAs. It serves as a point of comparison with the Doha scenarios. The 
results are reported for the year 2025. Two special assumptions have been made: first, the analysis 
does not account for the current high world prices of energy and food products, and, second, only 
the market access component of the modalities is implemented. Indeed, it appears that for both the 
European Union (Josling, Jean, and Laborde 2008) and the United States (Blandford, Laborde, and 
Martin 2008), the current domestic support modalities will not require deviation from actual farm 
policies before 2013. Moreover, when the WTO members liberalize under the DDA, the market 
access remains unchanged for non-WTO members. 
2 Net agricultural trade balances are based on average trade data between 2002 and 2004 extracted from the BACI database.3
CURRENT MODALITIES 
After seven years of trade talks, market access modalities have 
reached a high level of sophistication. Even if the general 
philosophy is simple, with progressive tariff-cut formulas for 
both agricultural and nonagricultural goods, many ﬂexibilities 
have been introduced with different degrees of special and 
differential treatment for different groups of developing 
countries.3 
Based on these modalities, agricultural tariff cuts will be 
performed according to a tiered formula, with broader bands 
and lower cut rates for developing than developed countries. 
Very recently acceded members and LDCs are exempted from 
new tariff reductions, and small and vulnerable economies are 
not required to reduce their applied tariff rates. All WTO 
members will be eligible to shelter a number of tariff lines 
(about 5 percent) from the full formula impact in exchange for 
tariff rate quota (TRQ) creation and enlargement. For devel-
oping countries, special products will be completely excluded 
from trade liberalization. Following the initiative of Latin 
American countries, additional tariff reductions have been 
requested from developed countries on tropical and diversiﬁca-
tion products. Additional cuts are also being implemented for 
processed products displaying tariff escalation features. A Long 
Standing Preferences clause is still under negotiation, in order 
to delay expected preference erosions for LDCs.
3 A full description of the modalities implemented in this study is provided in Laborde, Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe (2008). This scenario is based on 
the May 2008 Modalities (WTO documents TN/AG/W/4/Rev.2, TN/MA/W/103/Rev.1).
Figure 1—Distribution of tariff revenue collected on WTO LDC exports by destination market
Source:  MAcMapHS6v2.1 and authors’ calculations. 
Note:   Theoretical tariff revenue is computed as the product of actual trade multiplied by the applied preferential tariff. Thanks to the full implemen-
tation of the Everything But Arms European initiative by September 2009, LDC exports do not face residual protection, and, therefore, 




























productsThe iMPACT of The CenTrAL sCenArio
Due to initial preferences and, to some extent, product special-
ization, LDCs benefit least from current modalities as 
represented in our central scenario. Average protection faced by 
LDCs falls by 19.7 percent compared with 26.4 percent for 
other developing countries (Table 1), which is clearly a limited 
effect. More generally, unlike Northern markets, where 
preferences already exist, Southern markets do not open and 
therefore will be eroded. African LDCs benefit least from new 
market opportunities, with an average reduction of 8.2 percent 
(0.3 points) due to existing preferential market access. In 
contrast, the average protection affecting Asian LDC exports, 
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For nonagricultural products, a Swiss formula with a low 
coefficient, 8, has been implemented for developed countries, 
eliminating all existing tariff peaks. For developing countries, 
several options are offered combining different Swiss formula 
coefficients and flexibility coverage in terms of products with 
reduced or no liberalization. Once again, very recently acceded 
members, small and vulnerable economies, low binding 
coverage countries, and LDCs are not required to make new 
changes on their applied tariffs.
In the central scenario, we do not implement DFQF access 
for LDCs.
Table 1—Average protection faced by exporting zone (%)
Zones Baseline Central scenario Cut rate (%)
High-income countries 4.7 3.6 –23.6
Asia 4.7 3.6 –23.3
Europe 4.8 3.7 –23.1
North America 4.3 3.2 –25.6






Africa 4.7 4.0 –15.1
Asia 5.1 3.6 –29.6
Europe 4.9 3.5 –27.0
North America 1.8 1.4 –21.1






Africa 3.9 3.6 –8.2
Asia 4.6 3.0 –35.0
South America and 
Caribbean
3.6 1.9 –48.5
World 4.8 3.6 –24.4
 
Source: MAcMapHS6v2.1 and authors’ calculations (reference group weighting scheme).5
specialized in wearing apparel, is reduced by 35 percent  
(1.6 points) under the central scenario, representing one and  
a half times the world average.
 Globally, LDC exports to HICs decline by 2.6 percent 
under this scenario, while MIC exports to HICs increase by  
2.1 percent (Table 2). This, of course, reflects a substantial 
erosion of LDC preferences, in particular to Canada, the 
European Union, Japan, and some other OECD countries. For 
example, exports to Europe from Brazil, Australia and New 
Zealand, and South Korea are augmented, while exports to 
Europe from all LDCs decline in the range of 1.6 percent for 
Mozambique to 9.8 percent for Bangladesh. 
LDC exports to MICs increase by 2.2 percent, but this is 
lower than the increase in HIC exports to MICs. Notably, 
however, HICs represent a more important export destination 
for LDCs than do MICs in terms of export value. 
This negative evolution of LDC exports is particularly true 
for agricultural and agrofood products, in that the central 
scenario cuts these exports by 1.7 percent, reflecting a decrease 
ranging from 0.7 percent for Malawi to 6 percent for 
Table 2—Impact of the central scenario on bilateral exports  























countries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.2
Middle-income 
countries 1.6 1.8 2.7 1.8 2.7 1.5 0.2 2.1 0.0 –1.5
Bangladesh 7.6 –31.0 –9.8 –9.0 –0.6 12.4 –0.6 –5.4 7.8 0.0
Cambodia 4.6 –29.9 –8.6 –22.5 4.6 12.0 7.3 –3.4 5.9 0.0
Other Asian LDCs 0.7 –6.2 –7.7 –1.0 1.2 3.7 1.1 –2.7 1.3 0.0
Senegal 1.0 0.4 –2.7 –13.9 8.0 0.6 8.1 –4.0 3.8 0.0
Rest of West Africa 0.9 0.8 –2.8 0.2 1.7 –0.5 –3.4 –2.1 3.2 0.0
Central Africa 0.7 –0.2 –1.7 0.6 1.0 –0.5 –1.3 –1.0 1.5 0.0
South-central Africa –0.1 –0.8 –2.4 –1.8 0.1 –0.9 –1.2 –1.2 0.7 0.0
Madagascar 3.8 –2.7 –3.5 0.9 2.9 –5.5 –0.7 –3.6 7.8 0.0
Malawi 1.4 –0.6 –6.3 –2.3 –0.2 40.0 –26.8 –1.2 2.4 0.0
Mozambique 0.7 –0.2 –1.6 –3.2 1.8 1.1 –3.7 –1.5 3.8 0.0
Tanzania 0.3 –1.4 –5.6 2.4 5.8 2.2 –8.1 –4.0 3.7 0.0
Uganda 1.3 0.5 –2.6 –7.5 1.3 0.4 –4.4 –2.3 2.8 0.0
Zambia 1.3 –0.5 –4.8 0.9 –0.6 0.8 –0.9 –2.2 0.9 0.0
Rest of East Africa 1.1 0.9 –3.2 –1.9 0.1 0.0 3.6 –1.9 1.8 0.0
Low-income 
countries 1.4 –15.7 –4.7 –3.4 1.0 2.7 –0.7 –2.6 2.2 0.0








rCambodia. Simultaneously, this scenario is positive for 
Australia and New Zealand (9.4 percent), Canada  
(6.6 percent), the European Union (13.4 percent), and Brazil 
(12.7 percent). As expected, the erosion of LDC preferences 
occurs in sectors like rice, sugar, and meat and meat products.
The central scenario also confers a negative effect on LDC 
industrial exports, though it is 50 percent smaller (−0.8 
compared with −1.7 percent in agriculture). The scenario 
implies particularly negative effects for Bangladesh’s industrial 
exports, which drop by 4.7 percent, and those of Madagascar, 
which drop by 3.6 percent.  
This also reﬂects erosion of preferences because it mainly 
concerns the leather, textile, and apparel sectors where Most 
Favored Nation (MFN) duties are relatively high in HICs, 
implying that current preferences are valuable for these 
countries. 
As a consequence, the central scenario has a negative 
impact on agricultural and agrofood production in all LDCs. 
The impact is mitigated in industry, except in Bangladesh and 
Cambodia, where industry is substantially hurt. This trade 
reform leads to real income losses for almost all LDCs. The loss 
is substantial for Cambodia and Madagascar and a little less 
substantial for Bangladesh and Malawi. This real income effect 
stems from a deterioration of terms of trade, which, as 
explained in the previous section, may have two, potentially 
cumulative, origins: erosion of preferences and rising agricul-
tural world prices for net food-importing countries.
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS 
From this core simulation, ﬁve additional scenarios focusing on 
the DFQF regime have been implemented.
￿ The  F scenario supposes DFQF market access for LDCs in 
Brazil and OECD countries, excluding South Korea but 
including Mexico and Turkey. It authorizes a 3-percent 
exemption clause in terms of products. The list is deﬁned 
by each OECD country vis-à-vis all LDCs. Finally, only 
WTO LDCs beneﬁt from the DFQF market access. Note 
that this is, in fact, what has been deﬁned in the modalities 
published in May 2008.
￿ The  FS scenario mimics scenario F, but the 97 percent of 
DFQF is deﬁned on a bilateral basis such that a speciﬁc list 
of excluded products is made by each preference-giving 
country for each LDC.
￿ The  F100 scenario is similar to scenario F but includes a 
100 rather than 97 percent DFQF (that is, it eliminates 
any excluded products).
￿ The  FEL scenario implements a geographic extension of 
DFQF access for LDCs in India, China, and South Korea 
with an excluded products clause deﬁned at 3 percent of 
tariff lines.
￿ The  FEL100 scenario is similar to the FEL scenario but 
offers a 100 rather than a 97 percent DFQF.
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Table 3—Average protection faced by WTO LDCs, DFQF scenarios
 Baseline Central F FS F100 FEL FEL100
All WTO LDCs 4.2 3.4 3.2 3.3 2.7 2.9 1.9
Cut rate (%)  –19.7 –24.5 –20.3 –35.7 –31.0 –53.4
Africa 3.9 3.6 3.4 3.6 3.1 3.1 2.4
Cut rate (%)  –8.2 –13.9 –8.2 –20.4 –22.1 –40.3
Asia 4.6 3.0 2.8 2.9 2.0 2.6 1.3
Cut rate (%)  –35.0 –38.7 –36.4 –56.0 –42.8 –71.1
South America 3.6 1.9 1.8 1.9 0.9 1.7 0.7
Cut rate (%) –48.5 –49.4 –48.5 –75.8 –52.3 –81.6
Source: MAcMapHS6v2.1 and authors’ calculations (reference group weighting scheme).First, the basic DFQF scenario (scenario F), has a limited 
impact on LDCs: the average tariff cut shifts from 19.7 percent 
without DFQF (under the central scenario) to 24.5 percent 
(Table 3). This gain benefits comparatively more African 
countries (market access opportunities rise by half) than Asian 
countries, where no real additional gains are recorded (the 
average tariff cut shifts from 35 to 37.7 percent). Allowing 
importers to define DFQF based on 97 percent of the products 
on a bilateral basis (the FS scenario) limits the ambition of the 
initiative (see Table 3, columns F and FS), in particular for 
African countries. 
The 100 percent DFQF (scenario F100) with the same set 
of granting countries has a very powerful effect in that it nearly 
doubles market access opportunities. The average duty applied 
on Asian LDC exports is reduced by more than half, while the 
average rate levied on African LDCs falls by 20 percent. Once 
again, the U.S. apparel sector plays a crucial role for 
Bangladesh. Notably, scenario F100 benefits Asian LDCs 
significantly, as it would reduce the current preferential margins 
available to African countries in the United States under the 
African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA), enabling Asian 
LDCs to compete.
Extending the DFQF 97-percent initiative to other 
developing countries (China, India, and South Korea) has a 
more limited impact, on average (faced tariffs drop from  
3.4 percent under the central scenario to 2.7 percent under the 
F100 scenario and only 2.9 percent under the FEL scenario). 
African countries benefit the most; indeed, the FEL scenario is 
even better for them than the F100 scenario. Asian LDCs 
already benefited from some preferences in China and India 
and are heavily specialized in products where these two 
emerging countries have strong comparative advantages; hence, 
they do not gain new market access opportunities in this case. 
In contrast, due to different trade specializations, new prefer-
ences in these markets are quite attractive for African LDCs. 
Finally, by combining both the geographic extension of 
preferences and the elimination of excluded products, the 
FEL100 scenario appears to be a win–win solution for African 
and Asian LDCs, cutting the average tariff barriers they 
currently face by more than half.
In terms of exports, the DFQF regime, agreed upon at the 
Hong Kong Ministerial conference, in fact has a minimal 
impact on LDC exports since the results are very close to those 
implied under the central scenario. The main positive changes 
reflect market access increases for agricultural exports from 
Africa to Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey, where initially there was 
no preferential market access. Under the DFQF regime without 
excluded products, agricultural and agrofood exports from 
LDCs increase by 22.5 percent as opposed to decreasing by  
1.7 percent under the central scenario. Similarly, LDC produc-
tion in these sectors increases by 3.9 percent instead of 
decreasing by 0.3 percent under the central scenario. Most of 
these increases reflect strong stimulation of a few agricultural 
products (rice, milk, and sugar) and the textile and apparel 
sectors. For example, apparel exports from Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, Madagascar, and Uganda to Mexico all increase by 
more than 400 percent.
In contrast, the geographic extension of this preference 
under the FEL scenario has a small but positive impact on 
global LDC exports and on real income, despite a substantial 
increase in exports of cereals and “other manufactured 
products” in several LDCs. The selection of excluded products 
on a bilateral basis greatly reduces the ambition of the initiative, 
particularly for African countries and for Bangladesh. 
Conversely, a DFQF regime without OECD- or BrIC-
country excluded products is significantly beneficial for LDCs, 
in terms of both exports and real income. This is particularly 
true for Cambodia, Senegal, Madagascar, Tanzania, and other 
Asian LDCs for which real income gain is substantial.  
ConCLusion
These results have shown that the potential benefits to be 
gained by LDCs from the trade reform designed by the 
modalities made public in May 2008 are negligible. First, 
LDCs are not committed to modifying their own trade policies 
and therefore will not grasp any benefits coming from domestic 
reforms. Second, LDCs could be hurt by the erosion of existing 
preferences. Third, most LDCs are net food-importing coun-
tries that will be negatively affected by the current trend of 
rising food prices, which is only expected to increase with the 
removal of agricultural distortions. Since LDCs are a heteroge-
neous set of countries on these two last issues, they may have 
different preferences concerning the design of multilateral trade 
liberalization and can even have conflicting interests. 
Therefore, it is important to offer an ambitious agreement of 
benefit to each of them.
As a result, it would seem appropriate for WTO negotia-
tors to make a supplementary effort in favor of the poorest 
countries. The DFQF Initiative moves in the right direction, 
but it should be extended not only from a product perspective, 
with a 100- rather than a 97-percent application, but also in 
terms of geographic coverage. The initiative must be supported 
by both OECD and BrIC countries. In the short run, this dual 
approach is the only way to enhance market access for LDCs 
and to counterbalance the strong preference erosion they will 
face in their traditional export markets. Of note, it is in the 
interest of Asian LDCs to prioritize full openness of OECD 
markets (a 100-percent DFQF regime), particularly full access 
to the U.S. market, while African countries will draw more 
benefits from a geographic extension of this regime to BrIC 
countries. 
Finally, LDCs are hurt not only by a lack of market access 
but also by rules of origin and technical, sanitary, and phyto-
sanitary regulations. They also have a trade-related 
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infrastructure problem that can be addressed by the Aid for 
Trade initiative. This is the price to be paid for a successful 
development agenda under the aegis of WTO.
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